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Abstract 
 
Internet-enabled markets are becoming viable venues for procurement of professional 
services. We investigate bidding behavior within the most active area of these early knowledge 
markets: the market for software development. These markets are important both because they 
provide an early view of the effectiveness of online service markets and because they have a 
potentially large impact on how software development services are procured and provided. Using 
auction theory, we develop a theoretical model that relates market characteristics to bidding and 
transaction behavior, taking into account costly bidding and bid evaluation (two factors that 
distinguish these markets from other types of auctions). We then test our model using data from 
one active online market for software development services. Our data show that the market we 
examine is quite active, yielding contracts for 30%-40% of posted projects. In their current 
format, however, the studied market may induce excessive bidding by vendors. Consistent with 
our theoretical predictions, larger projects attract significantly more bids, with lower average 
quality. Greater numbers of bids raise the cost to all participants, due to costly bidding and bid 
evaluation. Perhaps as a consequence, larger projects are also much less likely to be awarded.  
 
Keywords: Internet, Electronic Markets, Software Contracts, Reverse Auctions, Bidding 
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I. Introduction 
The Internet is becoming a universal platform for the development of new electronically-
mediated markets. While many of the initial online markets focused on the exchange of physical 
commodities (books, CDs, collectibles), there has been a recent emergence of marketplaces 
directed at the trade of services. Given that services are estimated to account for 70% of gross 
domestic product in the U.S. (Quinn, 1992), this greatly expands the scope of economic 
efficiencies and new business opportunities enabled by the Internet. Moreover, the emergence of 
these markets represents the continuation of an ongoing trend toward less hierarchical forms of 
organization and a more market-based economy (Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987; Gurbaxani 
and Whang, 1991; Malone and Laubacher, 1999).  
One of the largest and most active areas of these service markets is the trade of Information 
Technology (IT) expertise such as software development and web design. Most existing 
knowledge- or expertise-trading sites1 provide the ability to trade IT services, and they tend to be 
very active compared with other types of services transacted in these markets, such as 
accounting, technical writing, legal services, advertising, consulting, and administrative support. 
Thus, by examining the behavior of IT service markets, we can gain early insight into how 
Internet-based service markets will evolve more broadly. Moreover, these types of markets may 
have a significant impact on the way IT services are procured, enabling the ability to efficiently 
outsource small2 projects.  Currently this niche is either filled through internal staffing due to the 
high fixed transactions costs of utilizing external vendors, or through regular relationships with 
independent contractors or temporary employment firms in situations where internal staff is not 
available or lack the requisite skills.  Online service markets can potentially provide the 
specialization benefits of using external contractors while substantially reducing procurement 
                                                 
1  Examples include freeagent.com, eLance.com, and eWork.com that utilize a request for proposals and reverse 
auction model (bidding on projects). There are also other markets such as Keen.com and liveadvice.com that 
deliver services over the telephone; experts-exchange.com and hotdispatch.com support the exchange of 
services in a question and answer format.  Transaction sizes in the telephone-based and question and answer 
markets tend to be small, on the order of $10 or less, while the RFP markets tend to handle much larger 
transactions.   Little is known about the overall profitability of these markets since most are privately held and 
in startup phase. 
2     Most of the projects traded in these markets would be considered “small”, involving less than six person-
months of effort (McConnell, 1996).  As a reference point, these projects would fall in the lowest decile of 
project size considered in software cost estimation studies (see, e.g., Kemerer, 1987, pages 53, 79 and 114).  
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costs enabling direct cost savings and improved quality, leading to a potential increase in 
demand for small-scale, specialized IT projects. 
A typical transaction in these markets is conducted as a procurement auction (or “ reverse 
auction”) where vendors tender bids. The process of such an online market includes the 
following activities.  A client creates a Request for Proposal (RFP) that describes the desired 
services (i.e., project description, scope, deliverables, submission deadline, project deadline, etc.) 
and posts the RFP to the online marketplace. Meanwhile, IT vendors continually search the site 
for RFPs that match their areas of expertise. When the vendors find a suitable RFP, they prepare 
a bid package that includes an asking price as well as supplementary information such as a 
description of their capabilities, and a proposed method of completing the project. The vendor 
submits the bid, which is routed to the client. The client then reviews all of the bids and chooses 
the best bid, presumably the best tradeoff between price, vendor quality, and fit. The process of 
bid evaluation is idiosyncratic to each buyer. There are no guidelines to evaluating bids and the 
market provides minimal assistance in this process, leading to high evaluation costs. 
 The primary role of the site is in helping buyers find vendors (and vendors find buyers) by 
reducing frictional transactions costs. In addition, online marketplaces serve the secondary role 
of reducing opportunistic behavior by maintaining and disseminating public reputations for 
market participants. For these services, they typically charge a transaction fee (levied on final 
project value) and in some cases, membership fees for buyers, vendors or both. 
The online auction is unique in that it dramatically reduces transaction costs, enabling a 
multitude of international vendors to participate in every auction. Increased participation reduces 
expected costs for clients from intensified competition, while concurrently offering better 
quality. The online setting also facilitates research of auction behavior through the large number 
of transactions facilitated on the exchange.  Although these markets are essentially procurement 
auctions, they also have a number of characteristics that distinguish them from auctions for 
physical goods (especially auctions for commodity goods). The RFP and bidding process must 
result in the exchange of much more information because projects and qualifications are not 
standardized. Unlike the trade of physical commodities where a part number, industry standard 
(e.g., MIS-SPEC, ANSI, ISO, etc.) or short description can be sufficient to fully describe a good 
required, IT services are highly customized, and idiosyncratic. Moreover, unlike many physical 
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commodities that have objective tests of quality (e.g., composition, strength, reliability, etc.), IT 
services face subjective evaluation of the work product. As such, the range of possible 
characteristics and quality levels of services is virtually unlimited.  In procuring these services, 
both buyers and vendors bear substantial costs of bidding and evaluating bids. As shown by 
Samuelson (1985), costly bidding alters many of the qualitative predictions of the theoretical 
auctions literature. In these markets costly bidding effects are likely to be large.  The success of 
these markets will be significantly affected by their ability to manage problems of costly bidding 
and quality uncertainty. 
The contribution of this paper is in our evaluation of buyer and vendor behavior in online 
service markets derived from actual bidding and transaction process in one IT service market. 
We begin by using auction theory to construct a theoretical model of reverse auctions, which 
accounts for both costly bidding and variation in vendors’ cost and quality. This model generates 
specific predictions about the number and quality of bidders for each RFP as a function of 
market characteristics, information revealed by buyers, and bidding costs. Specifically, we 
predict that when bidding is costly, buyers with a higher willingness to pay for project quality 
receive more bids, and those bids are of lower average quality.  While this may seem surprising, 
the intuition behind this result is that higher value projects create greater rents for low-quality 
bidders, encouraging them to participate, even when their likelihood of success is small.  When 
bid evaluation is costly, this “excess bidding” may discourage contracting by buyers. We find 
empirical support for these predictions using data drawn from one prominent online IT service 
market.  These results are interesting because excess bidding on high value projects may 
decrease participation or limit the maximum value of projects that can be effectively transacted 
using online marketplaces.  
II. Background and Literature Review 
Online spot markets are one way that the Internet is profoundly changing the way business is 
organized and transacted (Malone and Laubacher, 1998; Lee and Clark, 1996; Malone, Yates and 
Benjamin, 1987; Malone and Rockart, 1991). The fundamental argument, originally attributed to 
Coase (1937), is that the choice between external market procurement and internal hierarchical 
control (firms) is determined by the relative costs of performing transactions in these two 
organizational structures. Historically, entrepreneurs formed firms because of the high cost of 
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external transactions, including the costs of: searching for vendors; entering into short-term 
contracts for services; and monitoring supplier behavior (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; 
Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991). Internalizing transactions into a firm reduced transaction costs at 
the expense of foregoing economics of scale, scope or specialization available by contracting 
with the best available supplier in the market.  
However, numerous technological and business innovations are shifting the balance between 
the benefits of firms and the benefits of markets (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1993; Clemons, Reddi 
and Row, 1993). These include the reduction in communications costs, the near universal access 
of the Internet, innovations that support trust and quality assessment in otherwise anonymous 
markets (Dellarocas, forthcoming; Maes, 1994; Resnick and Varian, 1993), and standardization 
of complex transactions.  The emergence of online service markets may suggest that transactions 
costs are now sufficiently reduced to favor market procurement, at least for some types of 
services (Malone and Laubacher, 1998).  IT services have proven particularly attractive for early 
online service markets because they can be delivered digitally and the transaction participants are 
typically comfortable with online business interaction. 
II.A. Markets for IT Services 
While contracting for IT services is similar to other types of business procurement, it has 
additional complexity due to the degree of customization, the lack of standardization, and 
difficulty in assessing quality of a largely intangible work product.  Moreover, this complexity is 
further compounded by challenges in the management of software projects, which often have 
substantial deviations from original specifications of time, cost or functionality (Standish Group, 
1995). As a consequence, both the frictional transactions costs (search, vendor selection, 
negotiations)3 and potential for vendor or client opportunism in IT outsourcing can be quite high. 
Online markets for IT services principally reduce the frictional transactions costs by 
aggregating supply and demand, facilitating competitive price discovery, broadening reach, and 
lowering direct procurement costs –  thus, they principally reduce frictional transactions costs.  
Online markets may also be superior to other procurement approaches for small-scale projects as 
they reduce the role of a high-cost high-service intermediary (e.g., temporary placement firms) 
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and are much faster and more flexible than hiring specialized internal staff.  However, the rapid 
and anonymous nature of the transaction may increase the potential for opportunism or limit the 
use of outsourcing practices that improve contractual performance such as the promotion of 
relationship specific investment (see Saarinen and Vepsalainen, 1994; DiRomualdo and 
Gurbaxani, 1998).  As a result, we would generally expect online IT service markets to be 
prevalent in small-scale projects where transaction risks (opportunism) and needed mitigation 
measures are limited, and where search and other frictional costs are likely to be large in 
proportion to the transaction size. 
II.B. Bidding in Auctions 
The use of auction-like mechanisms for product and service procurement has been well 
studied in the economics and management literature. Because auctions enable price discovery, 
they are a desirable way to facilitate trade, especially for those goods and services without a 
standard market price (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Milgrom, 1989). Under a standard set of 
assumptions, many common types of private value auctions are equivalent to an open, ascending 
bid (English) auction (Vickrey, 1961; Riley and Samuelson, 1981), which has a number of 
desirable properties such as allocative efficiency and truthful revelation of private value. 
However, when the assumptions of the classical auction literature are relaxed, auction design 
influences outcome in a variety of ways. Most importantly for the purposes of this paper, we 
reject the common assumption that bidding and bid evaluation have negligible costs. In service 
auctions, both bidding and bid evaluation for services can entail significant costs in evaluating 
RFPs, estimating project costs, reviewing bid packages, evaluating prospective vendors, and 
ranking the bids against complex, subjective criteria. In investigating bidding behavior in 
forward  auctions, where a seller intends to sell an item to the highest bidder, Samuelson (1985) 
shows that when bidding is costly, only bidders with values above a certain threshold participate. 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, Samuelson shows that this threshold decreases as the value of the 
good increases –  lower quality bidders trade off greater bidding costs against the greater surplus 
to be gained from success and opt to participate. In the procurement context, this implies that a 
buyer that sends a larger project to the market or has a high demand for quality (thus a greater 
                                                                                                                                                             
3  For instance, Barthelemy (2001) surveyed outsourcing clients and found that contracting costs amounted to 6% 
of contract value for contracts less than $10 million. 
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willingness pay) will attract a larger pool of bidders with lower average quality. By itself, this 
would not be problematic if bid evaluation is free; but increasing the number of bids increases 
bid evaluation costs. If these excess bids are also from low quality vendors, then the added 
breadth of bids brings no added benefit to the buyer. These costs arise either due to the real or 
opportunity costs of the actual evaluation process, or the losses due to selecting a less than 
optimal vendor when evaluation costs lead to limited search. In modeling procurement auctions 
we reframe Samuelson’s model of costly bidding to incorporate additional facets relevant in the 
context of purchasing including the price-quality tradeoff faced by the buyer and bid evaluation 
costs.  
Costly bidding can also affect the optimal length of an auction under the assumption of 
random arrival of bidders. When bidders arrive randomly at the auction, the optimal length of an 
auction is determined by the tradeoff between inventory holding costs of the vendor and 
maximizing transaction price by waiting for additional buyers to arrive (Amihud and Mendelson, 
1980; Vakrat and Seidman, 1999). When bid evaluation is costly, however, it may actually be 
desirable to shorten the auction, because greater arrival of bidders now results in additional 
evaluation costs. 
II.C. Online Auctions  
Online auctions have become prevalent for physical goods because they combine broad 
reach, reduced need for physical infrastructure, and customer convenience of online selling, with 
the auction benefits of dynamic price discovery, aggregation of demand, and the creation of a 
better match between supply and demand (Beam and Segev, 1998; Lucking-Reiley, 2000; Klein, 
1999).   A variety of online auction formats have been utilized, the most common being the 
ascending price (English) auction format. However, Internet auctions are amenable to more 
complex auction formats indicated by the increased use of multi-unit and combinatorial auctions 
(Beam and Segev, 1996; Vakrat and Seidmann, 1999; List and Lucking-Reiley, 2000). In the 
Business-to-Business (B2B) area, firms such as FreeMarkets.com (founded in 1993) have 
pioneered the use of RFP-based reverse auctions, principally for the procurement of commodity 
or near-commodity manufactured inputs (Sculley and Woods, 2000; Rangan, 1999), and the 
conduct of services marketplaces is gaining attention (Arora et. al., forthcoming).   Little is 
known about the use of online auctions for intangible services. 
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III. Model:  Reverse Auctions for Services 
We model a general procurement auction market for services. Consider a single buyer (or 
“client”) interested in finding a vendor to provide her4 with a well-defined service (a “project”) 
using a 3-stage process facilitated by a marketplace (Figure 1).  The process begins with a buyer 
submitting a project to the market in the form of an RFP. In the RFP, she details the nature of the 
service required and the criteria that will be used to evaluate replies. This information enables 
vendors to evaluate their suitability for the project and to discern the value of the project to the 
client.  There are n vendors in the market. This number is less than the total number of vendors 
in a domain because some vendors have capacity constraints or do not follow the postings at a 
certain time. Vendors of heterogeneous quality examine the RFP and decide to bid trading off the 
cost of bidding against the expected profit from bidding (Stage 1).  This expected profit 
incorporates both the profit from winning at their optimal bid and the probability of winning, 
given that the buyer ex-post can determine the optimal price-quality tradeoff among bidders.  
Bidding vendors prepare a bid description and set a fixed price for project completion.  At the 
end of the auction (Stage 2), after observing the number of bids, the buyer decides whether to 
incur the cost of evaluating bids or withdraw from the market.  If the buyer decides to evaluate 
bids, she selects (in Stage 3) the bid that maximizes her surplus (trading off price and quality) 
given the information in the bid and from the marketplace (ratings, descriptions, etc.).5 
                                                 
4  We use the convention of female for the client and male for vendors. 
5    Given that we assume RFP submission is free and there are no delay costs, we can limit our analysis to the 
buyer’s participation constraint after bidding is completed.  If there were opportunity costs in delaying a 
project until optimal completion or RFP submission was costly, there would be an additional participation 
decision for the buyer at Stage 0. 
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Figure 1: Time Line 
Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Participating 
Buyer posts 
RFP.   
Vendors learn about RFP and 
decide whether to bid.  Bidding 
Vendors submit price and incur 
bidding cost. 
Project bidding 
period ends. Buyer 
decides whether to 
evaluate bids. 
Buyer incurs bid 
evaluation cost and 
selects winning 
bidder  
III.A. Model Assumptions and Structure 
Figure 1 describes an extensive-form game with n+1 participants (n vendors and a single 
buyer) and three decision nodes of vendor participation and price setting, buyer participation, 
and vendor selection.  
Buyers are assumed to have a multi-attribute utility function V(q,p,CB(R,nb)) where q is 
quality of the vendor selected, p is price paid and CB(·) is the cost of bidding. CB(·) is a 
continuous, increasing, differentiable and quasi-convex function6 of (-R,nb) where R is a 
parameter describing the efficiency of bid evaluation which can vary across buyers and across 
time within a market, and the number of bids is nb.  For tractability we will assume a specific 
functional form for utility: V(q,p,CB(R,nb)) = vq –  p –  CB(R,nb). The buyer’s type is defined by 
the private information about v, the valuation of quality, which varies across buyers.  It is 
assumed that the buyer communicates v through the RFP.  The buyer has a strategic decision 
whether to evaluate bids in Stage 2. If the buyer chooses not to submit an RFP or to not evaluate 
bids V=0. A table of notation is provided in Appendix 1. 
Vendors (s) are risk neutral and have a cost of performing the required project which depends 
only on their quality (type), which for tractability we assume is linear in quality (C(qs)= cqs, c<v 
where c is a constant cost per unit of quality).7 All vendors also have a fixed cost of bidding cT. 
Thus, it is more costly for a higher quality vendor to complete the project. This can arise either 
due to higher direct costs or greater opportunities for contracting outside the market.  A vendor 
that bids a project at price (ps) and is awarded the project has a total profit of ps= ps-cqs -cT, a 
vendor who bids but is not awarded a project has profit ps= -cT , and profit is zero if a vendor 
                                                 
6  The rationale behind the quasi-convexity in nb is that each bid must be evaluated and ranked against some 
number of other bids. 
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chooses not to bid.  All parameters and choice variables are common information except vendor 
quality (type) which is drawn independently8 (IID) from a market-wide vendor quality 
distribution over [ q L , qU ] with a commonly-known, continuous, cumulative distribution 
function F(q).  Vendors know their own quality, other vendors know only the distribution of 
quality, and the client only knows the distribution of quality until Stage 3, after incurring bid 
evaluation costs. These costs depend on the method chosen to evaluate bids. After incurring bid 
evaluation costs, the client knows the quality of all bidding vendors with certainty.  We also 
assume that the transaction cost of bidding is low enough so that at least the best vendor could 
create positive surplus (i.e, v qU  –  c qU –  CB(R,1) > cT). Vendors make a strategic decision in 
Stage 1, when they decide whether to bid on the project and their bid.    
III.B. Equilibrium Behavior 
The sub-game perfect, Nash, equilibrium strategies are determined by backward induction.  
In Stage 3, the client is faced with the trivial decision problem to choose the best tradeoff 
between price and quality, with full information on vendor quality (having already incurred 
evaluation cost):  
Max  vqs –  ps       (1) 
{s} 
S.T.  vqs –  ps  ≥ 0 (participation constraint)  
Similarly, in Stage 2, the decision problem on whether to incur evaluation cost to select a 
vendor depends on whether the result in Stage 3 will yield positive surplus in expectation over 
vendor quality, given bid evaluation costs.  The buyer is thus trying to determine whether 
E[Max{vqs –  ps |s} –  CB(R,nb)] ≥ 0 at the optimal vendor choice; if this constraint is violated, the 
buyer opts out of evaluating bids.   
                                                                                                                                                             
7  This assumption is consistent with higher quality service being more expensive because of higher labor costs 
and higher opportunity costs; higher quality vendors can command greater prices in the open market. 
8  In general in a service market the IID assumption is restrictive because vendor quality may be correlated 
across projects (see Arora et. al., forthcoming), with high-quality vendors providing exceptional service to 
many similar customers. It is, however, justified in this context from the heterogeneity in projects and the 
diversity of vendor qualifications.  
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In Stage 1, vendors evaluate the client’s RFP and decides on their optimal bid given the 
number of other vendors (n) and the distribution of quality, which, in turn, determines their 
probability of winning Ps(ps,n) at any given price.  Thus, each vendor solves: 
Max E[ps(q|q=qs)] º ps(qs) = (ps - cqs)Ps(ps,n) - cT     (2) 
(ps) 
s.t. ps(qs) ≥0 (participation constraint) 
A vendor’s optimal action in this formulation depends on the optimal actions of other 
vendors (through the Ps(ps,n) term).  Following the auction literature (Riley and Samuelson, 
1981), we restrict our analysis to behavior under a continuous, pure strategy, symmetric, Nash, 
sub-game perfect equilibrium, with each vendor’s bid strictly increasing in quality: ps º p(qs).9 
Intuition for a symmetric equilibrium is based on the assumption that social welfare is increasing 
in quality (vi>c). Generating higher surplus enables a high quality vendor to charge a higher price 
for his service, while assuring that the offer is more attractive than one from a lower quality 
vendor. In equilibrium, higher quality vendors tender higher bids, earn greater profits and 
provide the client with more surplus.10 With this bidding strategy, the buyer’s optimal choice is 
to select the highest quality vendor that bids on the project.  
III.C. Hypotheses 
Given the structure of the game as described in the previous section, we now derive the 
equilibrium relationships between our exogenous variables (n, cT and F(q)), and the number of 
bids. 
From the vendors’ perspective, this is a first-price, sealed-bid auction over buyer surplus, as 
given by her multi-attribute utility function. Buyer utility is a function of willingness to pay (v) 
revealed through the RFP. Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, with price increasing in quality, 
assures that the probability of a vendor winning the auction is determined by the probability that 
                                                 
9  Proving the uniqueness of the pure-strategy, symmetric equilibrium is beyond the scope of this paper, and it is 
possible that asymmetric or mixed-strategy equilibria could exist.  The symmetric setting, where vendors draw 
their quality from a common distribution, suggests a symmetric equilibrium, with bids being monotonic in 
quality. For a proof of existence and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium for a first-price, sealed-bid, 
forward auction see Maskin and Riley (1996). 
10  Deriving vendors’ optimal bidding strategy is beyond the scope of this paper. See Snir (2000) for a formal 
derivation of equilibrium in this game. 
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all other vendors are of lower quality: Ps(ps,n) = [F(qs)]n-1 and therefore ps(qs) = (ps - cqs) 
[F(qs)]n-1 - cT.   
Given the fixed cost of submitting a bid, some low quality vendors generate negative profits, 
in expectation. These vendors do not participate in the auction, which characterizes participation 
by a threshold quality level (qm) –  all vendors with quality above this level bid and all below opt 
out.  The vendor that generates zero expected profit by bidding a price that equals the buyer’s 
surplus from the project identifies this break-even quality level. This vendor wins the auction 
only if all other vendors have lower quality and opt not to bid. Thus, the break-even minimal 
quality for vendors (qm) is implicitly defined by: 
ps(qm) = (vqm –  cqm) [F(qm)]n-1 - cT = 0      (3) 
Vendors of higher quality also bid on the project, offering the buyer a more attractive price and 
generating positive profits, in expectation. 
Of interest in our analysis is the characterization of break-even quality level. The next 
Proposition evaluates the comparative statistics of qm. 
Proposition 1: If cT>0 then qm exists, qmÎ( q L , qU ] and qm is increasing in n, c, and cT while 
decreasing in v. (Proof:  See Appendix 2) 
From the Proposition the minimal threshold quality of a vendor that bids on a posting is a 
function of the parameters of the market. As the cost of providing service increases, either 
through increased cost of bidding or due to increased cost of servicing a contract, the minimum 
threshold quality increases, favoring participation by higher quality bidders. Increasing 
competition (n) has a similar effect, because more bidders reduce the probability for any one to 
win the contract, lowering expected profit.  This solution also implies that if bidding costs are 
negligible, all vendors bid on every contract. With very low participation costs for vendors, the 
market would attract many low-quality vendors. Such a market would collapse under the 
onslaught of mediocrity (Akerlof, 1970). Only by sustaining reasonable bidding costs on bidders 
can the market assure that only high-quality vendors tender offers.  
Interestingly, however, the buyer quality preference (v) has the opposite result. Buyers who 
are interested in attracting high quality vendors induce participation by lower quality vendors. 
The intuition for this result is that lower quality vendors realize that the probability for winning 
Bidding For IT Services 
 
12  
the contract is low, because they are awarded the contract only when other vendors are of even 
lower quality. If the potential revenue is small, they do not tender bids. As willingness-to-pay 
increases, potential revenue increases, increasing the project’s attractiveness to low quality 
vendors. Increased participation by lower quality vendors deteriorates the average quality of 
bidders. This is shown in Figure 2, where vendors’ expected profit is shown as a function of 
quality (with parameters: n=10, c=2, cT=0.5, and qs~U[0,1]), for different levels of v. From 
Figure 2 greater willingness-to-pay lower the break-even quality level that bids, decreasing 
average bid quality and increasing the expected number of bids. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
These observations form the core of our empirical investigation.  Because clients with higher 
valuation for the requested service can expect lower quality vendors to tender bids, we posit that: 
Hypothesis 1: Clients with high value projects attract, on average, lower quality providers.  
We test this hypothesis by investigating the relationship between project value, bidder 
feedback ratings and other proxies for vendor quality. However, a more easily conducted test of 
our model predictions is to examine the number of bids. Unlike quality assessment, which is 
likely to be imperfect, the number of bidders is objectively measurable. With the number of 
bidders monotonically decreasing in the break-even vendor quality (from nb=n(1-F(qm)), a 
decline in qm yields an increase in the expected number of bidders. Thus, we test the second 
implication of our model: 
Hypothesis 2: Projects with higher values receive more bids. 
Our model predicts that more expensive projects attract lower quality vendors and a greater 
number of vendors. Increased participation with lower average quality has two negative effects 
for the buyer: increased cost of evaluating more bidders and greater difficulty in discerning 
vendor quality. Together these could lead to more instances where the buyer opts not to 
consummate trade.  
Our model is only one explanation why higher value project induce greater participation. It 
may be that some high quality vendors bid solely on high value project. This potential 
explanation and other alternatives are considered and analyzed in Section V. 
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IV. Empirical Analysis 
IV.A. Data 
The data for this study includes all Software Development RFPs posted and closed on a 
prominent online service market from January 1, 2000 to August 24, 2001. This site was chosen 
because it was one of the few sites that has a comprehensive history of projects and bidding 
available online.  Moreover, the market appears sufficiently developed to evaluate equilibrium 
bidding behavior. In all, 5,587 software development projects were posted in the chosen 
timeframe.  Of these projects, we omitted projects with incomplete data, “ invitation only” 
projects restricted to only a few vendors, projects that received no bids, and those at the extreme 
end of the value range (below $10 or greater than $100,000).11 The result was a dataset with a 
total of 4,887 observations. Of these projects, detailed data on bidding (e.g., bidder feedback) is 
available for only 3,761 projects due to the way the site retains bid information on some older 
projects, so some analyses are necessarily restricted to this subset. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our data. Overall, the descriptive statistics indicate 
that the market is viable and able to attract a wide variety of software projects. The majority of 
RFPs sought application development services, although a significant number involved database 
projects as well. More complex areas (e.g., handhelds) were significantly less common.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
The average project in this market receives 15 bids (from a pool of ~3,500 unique bidders) at 
an average price of $2,480. Median project value is, however, slightly less than $600, which 
indicates that the bulk of the projects are of low value.  Figure 3 shows the distribution of project 
values. This low median price is consistent with the argument that the lower costs in this 
electronic market might be particularly attractive to clients with small projects that could not be 
economically outsourced by other means. Of the 4,887 projects in the study 1,828 (38%) 
culminate in contracts in which the buyer chooses one of the bidding vendors. The average price 
for awarded contracts is $800. Auction length, an important factor in studying market 
                                                 
11  Projects at the low end of the range likely do not represent regular project prices –  either because they 
represent an hourly rather than a by-project rate, or they represent a non-market price. Very large projects 
(above $100K) are rarely transacted in this market and are sufficiently large that it is unlikely that this market 
is the only forum in which the project is open for bid. 
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participation, indicates that vendors can bid for a little over nine days, on average. The average 
expected time for project completion was nearly 39 days. Inspecting the final project price, we 
find that, on average, buyers pay 20% less than the average bid. Feedback ratings in this market 
are sparse and uncommonly high. Less than half the vendors earned feedback while the average 
score is 4.6 out of 5. Upward bias in feedback is a result of buyers’ only rating vendors they have 
selected and approved, and vendors’ incentives to build positive reputations (Dellarocas, 
forthcoming).  
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
Variation in our sample stems from the wide range of services desired. On the low-end, some 
of the RFPs solicit bids for simple programming tasks –  attracting average bids of less than $100.  
On the high-end, other buyers are interested in development of complete e-commerce sites with 
bids of over $10,000.  
Variables from our theoretical analysis in the previous section, variables prevalent in the 
literature, and variables crucial to this emerging market provide the basis for our econometric 
model.  The following is a list of these variables, with some discussion of each variable. 
Number of Bids (nb) is the number of bids per project.  Our theoretical model makes direct 
predictions about the number of bids as a function of other project variables. 
Average Bid (v) is the average bid price (across vendors) for a project. There are a number 
of possible metrics to evaluate project value. We choose averaging vendors’ bids on the project 
as a proxy for project value.12 We use the natural log of this variable. 
Market Maturity (M) is the overall age of the online market (in days) at the time of project 
posting (starting date of the auction). It is used to measure changes in market structure over time, 
such as positive network effects and growth in the number of participants. We use the natural log 
of this variable. 
Auction Length (T) is the duration (in days) over which the auction is open for bidding. The 
length of an auction determines the number of vendors that have an opportunity to see the 
                                                 
12  We would prefer to use a measure of client value, such as an Initial Estimate of the project’s cost. This 
variable, however, is available for only a small subset of projects, in the first six months of our dataset. The 
rank-order correlation between Initial Estimate and Average Bid, in this subsample, is 0.78 (p<0.01). 
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posting and bid on the project. As the buyer lengthens the auction, more bids should be expected 
if bidders arrive by some sort of random process. We use the natural log of this variable. 
Project Length (P) is the stated length of the project in days. The model discussed in 
Section 3 implies that the project’s value depends only on the buyer’s benefits from the project. 
In a heterogeneous data set, as the one in our analysis, project complexity may also drive 
expected price. If it is more difficult to complete a more complex project, then its price may 
increase. To identify the impact that buyer value has on the number of bids, we would like to 
control for project complexity. In this data set, we can use project length as a proxy for 
complexity. This is also consistent with payment based on project duration, where longer 
projects are more expensive. We use the natural log of this variable. 
Feedback is the average rating of the vendors participating in an auction. Each participating 
bidder may have zero or more feedback instances (on a 0-to-5 scale) received from prior 
projects. Hypothesis 1 postulates that low quality vendors are more likely to participate on higher 
valued projects. One metric for measuring vendor quality is the feedback they receive in the 
online market. To compute the feedback measure for a project, we average feedback scores 
across participating bidders with feedback. With less than half of the vendors having any 
feedback instances, this variable is missing for many projects. One alternative measure we 
consider is the fraction of bidders that have non-zero feedback as another indicator of quality. 
Other variables are also considered to gauge this effect (see Results section). 
Sub-category (Sj) is the type of project as categorized by the client. We control for five 
important sub-categories within the market for software development services. This control 
variable allows us to understand sub-markets which may have different values of the exogenous 
parameters of the theoretical model (especially n and F(q)). The sub-categories used are: 
Application Development, Database, Engineering & CAD, Handheld Devices and Other 
Software Services (used as the baseline). 
“ Preferred”  Vendor is a binary variable reflecting a special status that a vendor may opt to 
subscribe to. Those that elect preferred status must pay greater membership fees, undergo a 
background check, and are generally held to higher standards of conduct (for example, they must 
agree to use a dispute resolution service). The online market provider sets the terms and fees of 
this status. 
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“ Preferred”  Project is a binary variable that reflects whether only “preferred” vendors are 
allowed to bid. A buyer may opt to designate a project as such, limiting participation.  
IV.B. Econometric Specification and Estimates 
IV.B.i. Project Value and Quality (Hypothesis 1) 
Testing Hypothesis 1 is difficult with the type of data available from an online market. 
Proper estimation of the relationship between project value and average vendor quality requires 
comprehensive metrics for vendor quality. The supposed relationship is that higher project 
values induce participation by lower quality vendors (Proposition 1). Given that it would be 
prohibitively expensive for the market facilitator to comprehensively and objectively assess 
quality, quality cannot be determined conclusively.  
However, we can use a number of measures as a proxy for vendor quality. The first and most 
common metric is the feedback rating given to the vendors by the clients who use the online 
market. Feedback ratings in this market are uncommonly high with the project-average quality 
score of 4.6 out of 5.0 for those vendors that do have feedback. Furthermore, less than half of the 
vendors have any recorded ratings in the system at all. The rank-order correlation between 
average feedback and project value is negative (r=-0.13) and significant (p<0.01), as suggested 
by Hypothesis 1.13 Because buyers only rate vendors they have chosen it is quite common for 
these systems to be biased towards high ratings, reducing their information content.  
A second proxy for a vendor's quality is the presence of a feedback rating for that vendor. 
The presence of a rating suggests that the vendor has surmounted at least three tests of quality: 
they were screened by another client, won a prior auction, and completed a prior project. If we 
use the fraction of participating bidders with feedback as a sign of quality of the bidder pool, we 
also find a negative correlation (r=-0.10, p<.01). We find similar results using measures 
constructed from the proportion of vendors with average feedback greater than a threshold (e.g., 
greater than 4.75 or greater than 4.5 on average).  
The comprehensive information available in this online market allows us to investigate 
various other measures of vendor quality and to verify the hypothesized relationship between 
project value and quality (See Table 2). Two useful metrics in this analysis are the number of 
                                                 
13  Throughout this sub-section, we report rank-order correlations. Rank-order correlations avoid the problems of 
skewed variables and of biases arising from extreme values. 
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bids submitted by a vendor in all projects, and a vendor’s propensity for winning. Both of these 
metrics support our hypothesis. Higher valued projects induce participation by more active 
vendors, on average (r=0.40, p<0.01) and these vendors win contracts less often (r=-0.42, 
p<0.01), on average.14 A third measure of potential vendor quality is tenure in the market. We 
again find that larger projects tend to attract vendors with less time in the market (r=-0.05, 
p<0.01), suggesting greater possible problems with vendor opportunism due to a lack of 
reputational capital at risk.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
IV.B.ii. Project Value and the Number of Bidders (Hypothesis 2) 
In addition to predicting that the quality of the bidder pool decreases with increasing project 
value, our model also suggests that the number of bids increases with increasing project value 
(Hypothesis 2). In many respects, this hypothesis is easily tested because the number of bids is 
objectively measurable, and our model yields a specific relationship between number of bids and 
project value. To derive our estimating equation, we take the natural logarithm of both sides and 
rearrange equation (3) to find a structural relationship between project value and the number of 
bidders:15 
ln( )
ln( )1
ln( ( )) ln( ( ))
T
m
m m
c
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F Fq q
-
= + +
-
     (3a) 
In this equation, only n and v vary by project. The quantities c and cT are assumed constant 
across projects and bidders, and the quantities related to the cutoff value (qm and F(qm)) are 
characteristics of the market (conditional on n and v), but not an individual project. Thus, we can 
transform this equation by taking the Taylor expansion of the first (non-constant) term in 
Equation (3a) to yield our base estimating equation. To this equation we add additional control 
variables for market maturity, auction length, and project length (complexity) to yield a 
structural equation (index i refers to projects):  
Model 1: nb,i = b0 + b1ln(vi) + b2ln(Mi) + b3ln(Ti) + b4ln(Pi) + ei    (4) 
                                                 
14  These correlations represent the relationship between Average Bid and the average score for all vendors that 
bid on the project, similar to the correlation between Average Bid and Feedback discussed  earlier. 
15  Note that F(qm) is a cumulative density function, so ln(F(qm)) is negative. 
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Column (a) of Table 3 contains the estimates of Equation (4). The results support our 
hypothesis that buyers’ willingness to pay increases participation by vendors. If bidding were 
costless, we would expect the number of bids to depend only on the service required, not on the 
buyer’s project value. The coefficient on project value is positive and significant, with a value of 
approximately 1.65. This coefficient translates into the increase in bidding associated with an 
increase in project value. A $100 project receives approximately 12 bids, on average, while a 
$1,000 project receives almost 16 bids, on average.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Other important results from Column (a) in Table 3 are that the number of bids is increasing 
with increases in auction length (consistent with a random arrival explanation), and that as the 
market ages, more bidders participate (consistent with the presence of positive network effects). 
We also find that project length is significant, suggesting that this variable is successfully 
capturing at least some of the heterogeneity in project size, as intended.  
One possible confounding factor in this analysis is that the overall software development 
market is not monolithic. Instead, the online market that we study is actually comprised of a 
number of smaller sub-markets with different numbers of potential bidders, distribution of 
quality, or arrival rate of bidders to the market. One way to control for these effects is to include 
control variables for each subcategory (Sj,i) to yield: 
Model 2: nb,i = b0 + b1ln(v,i) + b2ln(Mi) + b3ln(Ti) + b4ln(Pi) + SbjSj,i + ei  (5) 
The results of Model 2 appear in Column (b) of Table 3. The results again support our 
hypothesis that higher valued projects induce more bidder participation with almost identical 
coefficients on the project value variable. Our previous results regarding the importance of 
market maturity, auction length and project duration also hold. From the additional controls, it is 
evident that each subcategory has different bidding rates, but that this variation is largely 
orthogonal to the relationship between value and number of bids. There is more bidding (than in 
the baseline category of Other) in Application Development and Databases, while bidding is 
limited in the small categories of Engineering and Handheld Devices. These results indicate that 
bidding activity is consistent with project posting. More active sub-markets have a larger 
community and thus more bids. 
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Even more generally, it may be possible that the responsiveness of bidding to project value 
differs across sub-markets. For instance, the distribution of bidder quality and the optimal cutoff 
value (qm) may differ across sub-markets, yielding a different degree of correlation between 
project value and bidding according to the formulation in Equation 3. The impact of different 
sub-markets within the software development market may go beyond the fixed-effects analyzed 
in Model 2. Model 3 interacts sub-category with our key independent variable, Average Bid. 
This allows us to evaluate whether bidding responsiveness varies across sub-markets.  
Model 3: nb,i = b0 + b1ln(vi) + b2ln(Mi) + b3ln(Ti) + b4ln(Pi) + SbjSj,i + Sbj Sj,i*ln(v,i) + ei   (6) 
When we allow the value-bidding relationship to vary by market (shown in Table 3 column 
c), we find that there is a similar heterogeneity in the responsiveness of bidding to value.  All 
sub-markets except Engineering show a positive relationship between number of bids and project 
value.16 Since the Engineering sub-market is small, both in terms of number of projects and 
number of bidders, these results do not change our assertion that higher value projects attract 
more bids.  
The inconsistent results for the Engineering domain may indicate that some service markets 
demonstrate behavior similar to commodities markets where participants self-regulate their 
bidding activity. If the vendor qualification for Engineering projects vendors is easy to assess 
before choosing a vendor, vendors without the required competencies are unlikely to bid, even 
on high value projects. Future research should ascertain whether certain domains behave similar 
to commodities markets. 
V. Project Awards 
The richness of our data set allows up to explore another important aspect of participation in 
the market, buyer participation and awards of contracts. We model buyer evaluation in Stage 3 as 
providing perfect information regarding vendor quality. In this market, with limited data on 
vendor competencies, buyer evaluation may yield imperfect signals regarding vendor quality. If 
so, buyers may choose the wrong vendor, yielding lower than expected profits. The realization 
that evaluation mistakes are possible and the direct cost of evaluating bids lead some buyers to 
                                                 
16  When regressing only Engineering projects, Average Bid has a negative coefficient (-0.227) that is not 
significant (p>0.5). 
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forego bid evaluation and opt not to contract after the auction closes. It is reasonable to 
hypothesize that the cost of choosing the wrong vendor increases with willingness-to-pay, both 
because of the buyer’s increased need for quality and opportunistic bidding by low quality 
vendors. We posit that: 
 Hypothesis 3: Clients with high value projects are less likely to award the project via the 
auction 
Tests of this hypothesis also enable us to examine the most likely alternative hypothesis to 
our model. An alternate premise is that participants are self-regulating with higher value projects 
generating participation by higher quality vendors. One possible justification is that high-quality 
vendors require greater compensation for their service, bidding only when buyers indicate 
greater willingness-to-pay. This alternate premise implies that higher value projects increase the 
chance of awarding the contract.  These two predictions can be clearly distinguished empirically. 
Returning to Figure 3, we find that the probability of contracting in the Software 
development market decreases with project value. In our sample, while 38% of all RFPs 
culminate in contracts, this proportion is 47% for projects under $1000, but only 24% for 
projects over $1000. 
To test this relationship formally, we use a logistic (Logit) regression of the probability of 
awarding a contract as a function of the average bid size. Table 4 presents these results, with and 
without controls for sub-markets, as discussed earlier. The coefficient on “Average Bid” is 
consistently around – 0.25 and significant across all models. Overall, these results indicate that 
the pool of vendors tendering bids for higher valued projects is not of higher quality (as 
perceived by the client) than those participating in lower valued projects.  This result supports 
our original theoretical prediction that low quality bidders opportunistically bid on high value 
projects leading to high bid evaluation costs. From inspection of the interaction effects of sub-
markets and project value it appears that this result holds across the different markets with 
similar propensity for not contracting (Table 4, Column c). All interaction terms have negative 
and insignificant coefficients, except for Handheld Devices.17  Because of the sparseness of data 
for this sub-market it is difficult to ascertain whether this is a systematic difference.  
                                                 
17  The Handheld Devices seems to behave differently, with a positive coefficient for the interaction term. When 
analyzed separately, the coefficient is positive (0.29) but insignificant (p>0.1). 
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INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
A difficulty of drawing strong conclusions from this supplementary analysis is that buyers 
might behave opportunistically, utilizing the online market as a way of gathering data without 
intending to actually enter into a contract, or may bypass the market and contract directly with 
their preferred vendor18 (Weber, 1994). We could hypothesize that buyers might use the auction 
for price discovery but not for awarding contracts, and then pursue the transaction internally or 
through other channels. Because the marginal value of better information on vendor pricing and 
the incentive to bypass the market are likely to increase in the size of a project, this type of 
opportunistic behavior would be more prevalent for large projects. In addition to this behavior 
biasing our tests of Hypothesis 3, it is also of significant practical importance –  opportunistic 
buyers create both deadweight loss and a wealth transfer out of the market, which is costly to all 
market participants. 
Without knowing buyers’ intentions or being able to observe their offline behavior, it is 
difficult to ascertain whether this type of buyer opportunism is widespread. However, we can 
examine whether it affects our results by examining different segments of the market where we 
expect these opportunistic behaviors to be less prevalent. Within our data, we can identify two 
segments that meet these criteria. First, we can restrict our analysis to buyers who transact 
through the market. Under the assumption that opportunistic behavior by buyers is an inherent 
trait, this trait is less likely to be present in firms that have demonstrated they will complete 
transactions. Table 5 column (a) reports the results for the 3,002 projects from buyers with at 
least one completed contract event throughout our dataset. We find that the effect of project 
value on the probability of contracting is essentially the same rate as across the entire population.  
Alternatively, we can consider buyers who register their projects for “preferred” status, 
which restricts bidding to “preferred” vendors. If a buyer was using the market for information to 
obtain leverage over another outside supplier in negotiation, it is in their best interest to have as 
many bids as possible. Thus, opportunistic buyers would skew auction conditions to attract low 
cost and low quality suppliers. Therefore, we would not expect buyers that restrict the auction to 
“preferred” status vendors to be entering the market opportunistically. Again, results in Table 5 
                                                 
18  The online market we investigate charged commission from vendors based on the size of the contract awarded. 
This offers an incentive for participants to bypass the market, avoiding these commissions. 
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column (b) show that even these buyers for the 648 projects requiring "preferred" status are more 
hesitant to contract for higher value projects, with a coefficient of – 0.9.  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
Online service markets have demonstrated that, despite a variety of potential problems, it is 
viable to transact for services in anonymous markets. Overall, nearly 2000 projects with an 
average value of $800 per signed contract were executed over the 20-month period considered. 
Moreover, the average price of the selected vendor was 20% lower than the average submitted 
bid, suggesting a substantial and measurable benefit of utilizing this market. Growth in this 
market attests to the market’s success, as well. Our target site grew from about 100 projects 
posted per month for the first three months of our sample period, to about 500 projects per month 
18 months later -- an annualized growth rate of nearly 200%.   
Current market design and strategic behavior, however, are likely to reduce the efficiencies 
of this market due to excessive bidding by vendors and the attendant costs of bid evaluation. 
While this provides the appearance of an active market, it has negative consequences. If bid 
evaluation were perfect and costless the loss from costly bidding would be due only to the direct 
cost of bidding.  However, in the presence of costly evaluation there are two additional sources 
of welfare loss on the buyer’s side: the direct cost of bid evaluation and the social cost of buyers 
with potentially surplus-creating projects opting out of the market.  These factors cause reduced 
participation in the market by both buyers and vendors. Such a market is especially likely to lose 
those buyers with preferences for high quality (and high cost) projects and those high-quality 
vendors who would serve these projects.   Thus, costly bidding and evaluation, and the strategic 
responses to them, may limit the liquidity of these markets for larger transactions. 
Our model suggests that an online market can remedy this situation by some combination of 
screening the quality of vendors, decreasing the cost of bid evaluation for clients, or increasing 
the cost of bidding to vendors. For instance, the site could invest in additional external audits or 
ratings, or perhaps require offline references or certifications to augment the somewhat sparse 
online feedback. Technological solutions provided by the market could also speed the process of 
bid evaluation. Greater standardization of the RFP and bidding process could lead to partial 
automation, which reduces human labor.  Such tools could help clients reject large numbers of 
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low quality bids, score the top candidates, and focus evaluation efforts on high quality 
candidates. Alternatively, the site could impose a bidding charge that discourages low quality 
bidders and indiscriminate bidding.  It would raise the minimal quality that participates, but the 
client would still have to evaluate remaining bidders. 
Our analysis is principally focused on vendor participation and the types of analyses that can 
be performed observing bidding and transaction behavior in a non-experimental, nearly 
anonymous, setting.  There are a variety of other interesting and important issues, both 
theoretical and empirical, that can be examined in these markets including equilibrium buyer 
participation behavior (including the optimal disclosure of information in a RFP), bidding 
behavior of vendors, mechanisms that induce truthful revelation of private value, and the 
effectiveness of screening technologies for evaluating bids, especially feedback systems which 
have proven useful in online auctions for physical goods.   While theoretical analysis of these 
questions is possible through formal techniques similar to ours the challenge will be to design the 
appropriate real experiments or identify suitable natural experiments which enable otherwise 
hidden factors such as private project valuation, true project structure or vendor capability to be 
objectively assessed apart from transaction behavior. 
Our results highlight both the opportunities and the challenges that might be expected 
transacting services through online markets.  As many types of services produce digital products 
and do not require large-scale production capital that drives the formation of large firms, the 
service industries should be even more amenable to increased outsourcing and the erosion of 
firm boundaries.  Especially in the IT domain, technologies that promote interoperability (e.g, 
object oriented techniques) and best management practices, for example the desire to subdivide 
larger projects into smaller milestones (McConnell, 1996), also favor the outsourcing of small-
scale projects.  However, the ability of online services to augment or displace other governance 
structures relies on the ability to handle larger transactions sizes.  Our results suggest that the 
“sweet spot” for projects in this market is relatively small, being in the lowest decile of typical IT 
projects (c.f. footnote 2), a concern that might be reduced if issues of costly bidding and bid 
evaluation could be more effectively addressed.  However, there are also other concerns of larger 
projects that might arise, especially vendor opportunism, which we have not considered in our 
analysis. 
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Given the early stage of these online markets, it is difficult to make robust conclusions about 
how such markets might evolve when they are orders of magnitude larger than they are now. It 
should be noted that this market is currently small, with only about $1.5 million transacted 
during the study period, but is growing rapidly. Given the overall size of the IT services industry 
(over $100Bn in the US alone), these markets have the potential to grow by many orders of 
magnitude provided that larger projects (which likely make up most of commercial IT 
contracting) can be effectively transacted online.  Yet, clients would not want the number of bids 
to grow by orders of magnitude.  Clearly, online markets need to consider scalability and the 
natural laws by which patterns of participation change as a function of market size. If these 
markets are managed correctly, however, they have an opportunity to dramatically change the 
methods of procuring services.  
Appendix 1: Notation 
Variable Description 
n Number of vendors 
V(q,p,CB(R,nb))   Client’s multi-attribute utility function 
Q Quality of service received 
P Price paid for service 
nb Number of vendors that bid in the auction 
CB(R,nb) Cost of evaluating bids 
R Technology for evaluating bids 
v Client’s quality valuation, measured empirically by average bid  
qs Inherent quality of vendor s 
ps Price charged by vendor s 
q L  Lowest possible quality 
qU  Highest possible quality  
F(q) Continuous c.d.f of vendor quality 
cqs Cost of providing quality service qs 
cT Cost of placing a bid 
Cs(q) Cost of providing service and placing a bid 
Ps(ps,n) Probability of acceptance for a vendor of quality qs 
ps(qs) Expected profit for a vendor of quality qs 
qm Break-even quality level 
M Market maturity (in days) 
T Auction Length (in days) 
P Project Length (in days) 
Sj Sub-category j; j=[0..4] 
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Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 
From equation (3) in subsection III.C.: 
ps(qm) = (vqm –  cqm) [F(qm)]n-1 - cT = 0 
To show the qm> q L  we show that for the lowest quality expected profit from bidding would 
be negative, while for the highest quality, expected profit is positive. Coupled with monotonicity 
of ps(qm) and the Fixed-point Theorem, this assures that their exists a break-even quality qm> q L . 
For the lowest quality F( qL )=0, ps( q L ) = – cT. For the highest quality F( qU )=1. When only 
the highest quality participates, ps( qU ) = (v qU –  c qU ) –  cT > 0, by assumption.  
Investigating the monotonicity of profit, the sign of the first derivative of the break-even 
bidder’s profit, with respect to quality, is positive (noting that v > c):  
p’s(qm) = (v –  c)[F(qm)]n-1 + (vqm –  cqm)(n-1)[F(qm)]n-2f(qm) 
The other results arise from investigating the expected revenue for the break-even quality 
bidder,  (vqm –  cqm)[F(qm)]n-1, and the cost, cT, of submitting a bid. 
Define a given parameter vector (n0, c0, v0, cT0) such that ps( qm
0 ) =0.  
If n1>n0 then )]([ 0
11qF nm
- < )]([ 0
10qF nm
-  and ps( qm
0 ) <0  
If c1>c0 then (v qm
0  –  c1 qm
0 ) < (vqm –  c0 qm
0 ) and ps( qm
0 ) <0 
If v1<v0 then (v1 qm
0  –  c qm
0 ) < (v0 qm
0  –  c qm
0 ) and ps( qm
0 ) <0 
If cT
1 > cT
0  then ps( qm
0 ) <0 
For any of these changes (an increase in n, c, cT or a decrease in v) the vendor of quality qm
0  
earns negative profit from participating. From the monotonicity of ps(qm) and ps( qU )>0 the 
break-even quality level under each of these changes increases.  
    QED 
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Variable Notation Number Mean Standard Median 
   of Obs.  Error  
 Number of Bids nb 4,887 15.1 13.25 11 
 Average Bid ($) v 4,887 $2,480 6785 $594 
 Market Maturity (Days) M 4,887 400.6 157.15 435 
 Auction Length (Days) T 4,887 9.2 10.05 7 
 Project Length (Days) P 4,887 38.9 68.16 21.0 
 Avg. Feedback (Scale of 0 – 5)  2,938 4.6 0.431 4.7 
 Contract Awarded  4,887 0.38 0.485 0 
 Winning Bid (when contracted)  1,828 $787 2861 $200 
 Preferred Vendor  4,109 0.37 0.353 0.29 
 Preferred Project  4,832 0.12 0.328 0 
Sub- Application Development S1 4,887 0.56 0.496 1 
Categories Database S2 4,887 0.21 0.405 0 
 Engineering  S3 4,887 0.029 0.169 0 
 Handheld Devices S4 4,887 0.028 0.164 0 
 Other S0 4,887 0.16 0.366 0 
 
 
Variable Correlation Matrix 
 Number of 
Bids 
Average 
Bid ($) 
Market 
Maturity 
Auction 
Length 
Project 
Length 
Contract 
Awarded 
Feedback 
Number of Bids 1.000 0.163*** 0.074*** 0.270*** 0.127*** -0.094*** -0.080*** 
Average Bid ($) 0.163*** 1.000 -0.012 0.103*** 0.198*** -0.144*** -0.041*** 
Market Maturity (Days) 0.074*** -0.012 1.000 -0.130*** 0.033** -0.035** 0.441*** 
Auction Length (Days) 0.270*** 0.103*** -0.130*** 1.000 0.247*** -0.237*** -0.100*** 
Project Length (Days) 0.127*** 0.198*** 0.033** 0.247*** 1.000 -0.123*** -0.047** 
Contract Awarded -0.094*** -0.144*** -0.035** -0.237*** -0.123*** 1.000 -0.006 
Feedback -0.080*** -0.041** 0.441*** -0.100*** -0.047** -0.006 1.000 
* p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Figure 2 –  Vendor Profit as a function of Quality 
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Figure 3 –  Distribution of Project Values 
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Table 2 –  Correlations between Project Value (Average Bid) and Vendor Characteristics 
Rank-order Correlations 
 
Variable Feedback Number of 
Ratings 
Number 
of Bids 
Winning 
Propensity 
Correlation -0.132*** -0.186*** 0.40*** -0.41*** 
N 3,471 3,739 3,739 3,739 
 
Table 3 –  Statistical Analyses 
Dependent Variable - Number of Bids 
 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  (a) (b) (c) 
 Constant -19.83*** 
(1.598) 
-24.03*** 
(1.533) 
-18.71*** 
(1.866) 
 ln(Average Bid) 1.65*** 
(0.117) 
1.62*** 
(0.109) 
0.71*** 
(0.216) 
 ln(Market Maturity)  2.44*** 
(0.248) 
2.42*** 
(0.233) 
2.43*** 
(0.232) 
 ln(Auction Length) 3.90*** 
(0.236) 
4.31*** 
(0.220) 
4.35*** 
(0.219) 
 ln(Project Length) 0.74*** 
(0.224) 
0.53** 
(0.209) 
0.46** 
(0.208) 
Sub- 
Categories 
Application Development --- 3.95*** 
(0.441) 
-2.27 
(1.543) 
 Database --- 11.95*** 
(0.518) 
-0.62 
(2.034) 
 Engineering  --- -4.69*** 
(1.003) 
4.73 
(3.964) 
 Handheld Devices --- -2.99*** 
(1.036) 
-8.90 
(5.535) 
Interaction Application Development*ln(Average Bid) --- --- 1.05*** 
(0.245) 
 Database*ln(Average Bid) --- --- 2.05*** 
(0.320) 
 Engineering*ln(Average Bid) --- --- -1.32** 
(0.590) 
 Handheld Devices*ln(Average Bid) --- --- 0.990 
(0.740) 
 N 4,887 4,887 4,887 
 R2 0.195 0.304 0.312 
 Regression F-Stat 295.85*** 266.53*** 184.56*** 
 DR2  0.109*** 0.08*** 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
* p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 4 –  Impact of Project Value on RFP Outcome 
Dependent Variable –  Probability of a contract being awarded 
 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  (a) (b) (c) 
 Constant 3.15*** 
(0.303) 
2.86*** 
(0.312) 
2.78*** 
(0.388) 
 ln(Average Bid) -0.25*** 
(0.023) 
-0.26*** 
(0.023) 
-0.25*** 
(0.048) 
 ln(Market Maturity)  -0.15*** 
(0.046) 
-0.13*** 
(0.047) 
-0.13*** 
(0.047) 
 ln(Auction Length) -0.87*** 
(0.048) 
-0.86*** 
(0.048) 
-0.87*** 
(0.048) 
 ln(Project Length) 0.14*** 
(0.043) 
0.13*** 
(0.043) 
0.13*** 
(0.043) 
Sub-Categories Application Development --- 0.41*** 
(0.091) 
0.53 
(0.328) 
 Database --- 0.34*** 
(0.106) 
0.77* 
(0.432) 
 Engineering  --- -0.117 
(0.224) 
0.007 
(0.877) 
 Handheld Devices --- 0.22 
(0.228) 
-3.04** 
(1.212) 
Interaction Application Development*ln(Average Bid) --- --- -0.02 
(0.055) 
 Database*ln(Average Bid) --- --- -0.07 
(0.071) 
 Engineering*ln(Average Bid) --- --- -0.02 
(0.139) 
 Handheld Devices*ln(Average Bid) --- --- 0.44*** 
(0.162) 
 N 4,887 4,887 4,877 
 AIC 5699.278 5681.586 5679.444 
 -2 Log L 5689.278*** 5663.586*** 5653.444*** 
 
Asymptotic Standard Errors in parentheses 
* p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 5 –  Impact of Project Value on RFP Outcome for Certain Groups of Buyers 
Dependent Variable –  Probability of a contract being awarded 
 
 Variable Model 4 (1) 
Transacting Buyers 
Model 5 (2) 
“Preferred” 
Projects 
  (a) (b) 
 Constant 3.05*** 
(0.494) 
11.27 
(7.758) 
 ln(Average Bid) -0.25*** 
(0.060) 
-0.90** 
(0.455) 
 ln(Market Maturity)  -0.12* 
(0.062) 
-0.84 
(1.146) 
 ln(Auction Length) -0.80*** 
(0.059) 
-0.77*** 
(0.142) 
 ln(Project Length) 0.28*** 
(0.058) 
0.25* 
(0.132) 
Sub-Categories Application Development 0.21 
(0.411) 
-4.48 
(3.161) 
 Database 0.52 
(0.572) 
-3.954 
(3.377) 
 Engineering  -0.39 
(1.189) 
-0.44 
(10.760) 
 Handheld Devices -3.75** 
(1.521) 
-6.19 
(3.880) 
Interaction Application Development*ln(Average Bid) 0.01 
(0.068) 
0.67 
(0.466) 
 Database*ln(Average Bid) 0.02 
(0.093) 
0.60 
(0.493) 
 Engineering*ln(Average Bid) 0.07 
(0.188) 
-0.13 
(1.622) 
 Handheld Devices*ln(Average Bid) 0.54*** 
(0.206) 
0.95* 
(0.539) 
 N 3,002 648 
 AIC 3626.726 736.795 
 -2 Log L 3600.726*** 710.795*** 
 
Asymptotic Standard Errors in parentheses 
* p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
(1) Subset of those buyers that have at least one transaction in the market 
(2) Subset of projects where participation was limited to “Preferred” vendors 
 
 
 
 
 
